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In this post, I argue that: (I) the influence of German jurisprudence on the legal
systems in Central and Eastern Europe results from transfers of legal knowledge
and “cooperative adaptation” of elites in the new democracies; (II) the German legal
hegemony is in fact a hegemony of reason and a culture of justification; (III) the
decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht in PSPP is an attempt to maintain the culture
of justification in view of its inevitable end.
I. The Role of German Foundations and Transfers of
Legal Knowledge
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the question of German hegemony may
appear unseemly. However, it is hard to deny that German legal doctrine was an
important source of influence and inspiration in this part of the world – at least until
recently.  It is therefore more appropriate to talk about the influence of German legal
culture on the legal systems in the new democracies after the regime change, as
well as on the European institutions. The principle of proportionality is an example
of exporting German legal culture but not as a commodity but as knowledge (art of
thinking).
In post-communist Poland, the constitution contained solutions inspired by
Grundgesetz (such as the rule of law and social justice, political pluralism, church
autonomy, protection of fundamental rights, albeit subject to limitations and
prohibition of encroachment upon their essential core, the procedure for appointing
the Council of Ministers, or a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal).
However, the detailed layout of the afore-mentioned institutions in the law, and its
interpretation and application remained in the hands of the locals, driven by the
political animosities of the time, the fears (of the past) and social amnesia, all outside
the control of the “hegemon”.  Due to the geographical proximity of Germany as a
well-established democracy, some Poles, Czechs or Hungarians took the opportunity
to learn constitutional craftsmanship in Germany. These processes of knowledge
transfers served the mutual interest in establishing friendly neighborly relations and
reliable conditions for trade and investment.
The German academic, political and religious foundations should therefore be
praised for creating educational, research, training and professional cooperation
programs for Eastern Europeans. In the perception of the fellows, usually born
after 1945, and their families, Germans could finally be good neighbors and
friends, not invaders. Additionally, participation in such exchange programs was
usually an advantage in the evaluation of candidates for various posts in the public
administration. As a result, lawyers with research experience in Germany held
many important positions, including the positions on the benches of the newly
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established constitutional courts in the region. For them, German jurisprudence was
a natural source of reference, but not the only one. For example, in 1598 judgments
of the Polish Constitutional Court issued since 1987, 86 cases refer to the Federal
Constitutional Court (FCC), and 164 – to the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights.
However, the “elite” of Polish lawyers with some professional experience acquired in
Germany did not change the local culture based on authority and not on justification.
It was therefore the authority of the Federal Constitutional Court or the European
courts, rather than their argumentation that was adopted as a new dogma, often for
pragmatic reasons. In a Gramscian sense, the German legal cultural hegemony did
not touch the “masses” that had not received civic legal education for generations.
Even in law schools, the work of Robert Alexy or Jürgen Habermas was presented
as an authority to be quoted, and not an invitation to critical thinking and self-
reflection. In other words, the Socratic contestation method was not part of the
educational systems in Poland (and, as I assume, in other Central and Eastern
European countries), even in law schools. Although in recent decades the social
spirit has begun to change due to increased social mobility, the new political
circumstances of authoritarian, ethnonationalist populism, which requires political
loyalty and subordination, have strengthened the culturally rooted inclination to
believe in charismatic leaders rather than in legal-rational power (and institutions).
To conclude, the transfer of legal knowledge to the Polish legal elite did not and
could not transplant the “German mindset,” shaped by the philosophy of Immanuel
Kant and his successors, or change the dominating attitude in the Polish nation
(or other nations in Central and Eastern Europe), which had lacked statehood for
centuries and inherited the experience of a phantom state.1)Jan Sowa, Fantomowe
cia#o króla. Nowoczesne zmagania z form#, Universitas 2011. Therefore, the
acceptance of legal authority – the rule of law and bureaucratic (and later European)
institutions – is a form of “cooperative adaptation”, but in essence, yet another
form of surrender. Although on both sides of the Oder River human dignity is a
fundamental constitutional principle, in Poland human dignity is read in accordance
with the teachings of John Paul II and Christian personalism. Given the attachment
of Poles to Christian tradition, in particular cases, human dignity may mean
something different than in Germany.
II. Hegemony of Reason and Culture of Justification
Postwar Germany itself was subject to the legal cultural hegemony of the United
States. The German legal system created after 1945 was based on “continental
positivism (…), but with a strong position of legal expert bodies – the high courts
of law and constitutional courts in particular”.2)Adam Sulikowski, „Apolityczno##
w prawoznawstwie : kryzys idei a zjawisko populizmu,” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Spo#ecznej 3 (2018), pp. 74-85. Its creation was supported by legal
sciences, which promoted the idea of apolitical law and remained uncritical of liberal
strategies of legal expert bodies. The liberal order therefore gained a hegemonic
position and gave meaning to legal texts, including constitutions, and consequently,
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to the concept of justice. The postwar liberal world order relied on the idea of political
consensus and the power of reason.
As Moshe Cohen-Elya and Iddo Porat pointly explain, the hegemony of reason
could develop “as result of the combination of four influences and processes, with
the first two the product of the traumatic effects of WWII: 1) decline of nationalism
and the rise of humanism and internationalism; 2) elitism and suspicion toward
popular democracy; 3) the traditional European organic conception of the state;
and 4) a European-based deep-seated and optimistic belief in legal objectivity and
rationalism”.3)Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Iddo Porat, “Proportionality and the Culture of
Justification”, American Journal of Comparative Law 59 (2011), pp 463-490.  The
culture of justification was to a large extent created by judicial and expert bodies
whose role was to control decisions of the “Sovereign” and its representatives. In this
project, the courts were perceived as “bulwarks of reason” and it was assumed that
they are “immune from populism, biases, and irrational motives”.4) Ibid.
Notably, confidence in rationality and objectivity of judges derived from the German
tradition of viewing law as a science. Yet, paradoxically, for the same reasons,
theology can be considered a science.5)Leszek Nowak, „Metodologiczne kryterium
demarkacji i problem statusu teologii,” Nauka 3 (2004). On the one hand, the culture
of justification assumes that legal interpretation is a scientific undertaking based
on logic, and on the other hand, it resembles interpretation of a sacred text, which
adopts a certain dogma (rationality of law and law-makers). It is also blind to the
fact that decoding the core values of the law may not always be perceived as strictly
scientific, but political, especially if it goes beyond the legal text or the intent of its
drafters.
Proportionality as a principle of law has a central role in the culture of justification.
Due to its global spread as a standard of judicial review, in particular in the area
of rights adjudication, proportionality has become a tool for promoting judicial
power and judicial “coercion of liberal values”. The standard proportionality analysis
entails three questions regarding the government measure in terms of its suitability,
necessity and proportionality in the strict sense. However, there is no uniform
standard of application of proportionality review in courts that followed the example
of the German Federal Constitutional Court. Even Bundesverfassungsgericht
occasionally departs from the model proportionality analysis, merging or skipping
the subtests for pragmatic reasons.6)Andrej Lang, „Proportionality Analysis by
the German Federal Constitutional Court”, in: Kremnitzer/Lang/Steiner (eds.),
Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial
Practice, CUP 2020. Moreover, its case-law has gradually shifted the focus on
the last subtest of proportionality analysis which requires balancing between the
colliding values and is more susceptible to ideological preferences of judges than the
fact-based assessment of suitability or necessity.7)Raanan Sulitzeanu, Mordechai
Kremnitzer, Shalon Alon, “Facts, Preferences, and Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of
Proportionality Judgment,” Law & Society Review 50(2) (2016), pp. 348–382.
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III. The End of the Age of Reason
The PSPP decision (2 BvR 859/15) is the voice of the legal elite represented in
Bundesverfassungsgericht which seeks to maintain its position as the ultimate arbiter
over constitutional matters but disregards the role of the CJEU as the highest judicial
authority in the European Union. By granting itself, in particular, but also, indirectly,
other constitutional courts of the Member States the power to carry out ultra vires
review in areas that undoubtedly fall within the competence of the EU, the FCC
fails to recognize that only the CJEU may declare invalid acts of EU law that violate
the principle of proportionality.8)Editorial Comments, Common Market Law Review
57(2020), pp. 965–978.
Labelling the CJEU’s decision as “not comprehensible and therefore objectively
arbitrary,” the FCC insisted that the burden of proportionality analysis in Weiss
should have been in the balancing stage. Yet, not only the wording of Article 5(4)
TEU, but also the strategy of judicial restraint requires that the CJEU does not
engage in assessments that rely on the attribution of values to policy choices which
are not clearly arbitrary or which clearly require expert knowledge. Therefore, limiting
its assessment to the suitability and necessity stages, the CJEU recognizes the limits
of its own competence.
On a more general level, the Weiss/PSPP controversy marks the end of the culture
of justification as we know it. Today, public discourse is dominated not by justification
(or reason), but by plurality of conflicting authorities. What matters, then, is not the
question “why?” but “who is the expert?” or “what is the source of the expertise?”.
Now that populism and other anti-systemic movements are challenging the existing
liberal status quo, the struggle to maintain the power of the last word continues. In
particular, populism seeks to ensure the primacy of political power over rationalized
procedures and discourses of legal expert bodies. In countries like Poland, the
delegitimization of institutions controlled by allegedly apolitical professionals by
the populists is relatively easy to implement in conditions where authority had its
cultural roots in tradition and charismatic leadership rather than reasons and rational
argumentation. More recently, however, the global pandemic has revealed a crisis of
political representation whose function is often limited to appointing proper experts or
using proper expertise.
We are therefore witnessing the end of the age of reason, while governments are
seizing the opportunity to govern human fear, hatred and uncertainty of tomorrow.
In such conditions, we understand less and less what is happening here, who is
governing us, and even less so WHY we have to follow rules that are often not even
provided for by statutory law.
The question concerning the path of European legal scholarship is thus open.
Although reason will continue to strive for hegemony, in many parts of the world, the
politically captured courts will only pretend to be guided by public reason and in fact
obey the political majority. If, however, emotions win the battle for the hegemon’s
throne, solidarity should take the place of reason. There is an opportunity for Europe
and Germany to deepen this idea, even at the cost of changing the current mindset.
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